Included in this packet are four samples of Honors Program proposals, provided by former Honors Program participants. While there is one proposal from each subfield concentration (American, Comparative, International Relations, Theory), please note that there is no template specific to any particular concentration. Formatting, style, and presentation vary from student to student, not necessarily according to subfield concentration. We hope that these will be helpful to you in preparing your own proposals.
Senior Honors Thesis Proposal
Government Department
Research Topic

According to G. John Ikenberry's theory presented in *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and Order After Major Wars*, the character of post-war relations between states has changed dramatically since World War I. As the 20th century progressed, states started building more and more institutions with each other after wars. Ikenberry explains this increased institutionalization as a reaction by states to increasing uncertainties and disparities in state power. I propose to apply his theory to US-Russian relations after the Cold War.

First, it is evident that US-Russian relations were and are characterized by uncertainty. Global relations during the Cold War, while antagonistic between its two superpowers, had an element of certainty because everyone knew who their friends and enemies were. This division was not as strong after the fall of the Soviet Empire. Emerging from the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was an unstable country as it underwent political and economic transitions as a country plagued by organized crime and drug use, suffering from a demographic crisis of historic proportions and fighting a brutal war in Chechnya. After simply looking at the history of US-Russian relations, one would assume an element of uncertainty would remain between the countries, as they were enemies for a substantial portion of the second half of the twentieth century. Although relations are no longer what would be called antagonistic, there has definitely been uncertainty over when Russia will go toward the West or toward its Soviet past.

Ikenberry's second characteristic of interstate relations, disparities of power, also seems to apply to the post-Cold War US-Russian relationship. Although Russia would
disagree, it is often stated that the US “won” the Cold War, and emerged as a global hegemon with economic, political, and military superiority over Russia and all other states. The prosperity of the US seemed and still seems a stark contrast to the despair evident in Russia as the country made and continues to make the tough transition from a planned economy to a free market, and from autocracy to democracy.

If the US and Russia display these two characteristics, and if Ikenberry’s theory applies, one would expect a high degree of institution building between these nations after the Cold War, but this has not been the case. The historical record of the US-Russian relationship from the creation of the Russian Federation until today does not seem to yield much evidence of extensive institution building. Although the Cooperative Threat Reduction program was arguably successful, there has been no follow-up programs guiding the US and Russia in a cooperative effort to rid the country of its “loose nukes.” The few other efforts there have been, such as PFP, START II and NACC, have not been very successful.

The Question

Based on Ikenberry’s theory about post-war institutionalization, one would expect the US and Russia to have responded to uncertainties and power disparities with increased institutionalization in the last decade. This has not been the case. Why has there not been a drive toward successful institution building between the US and Russia since the end of the Cold War?
Why is it important and interesting?

This question is pertinent for three main reasons.

First, as Ikenberry writes, institutions have been a big part of global relations since the end of World War II, especially in relations with the US. With the emergence of the EU and the potential further expansion of NATO, it is evident that institutions have become a key element in inter-state affairs. If the US and Russia continue to avoid institutions or form unsuccessful ones, this must certainly affect how these nations are perceived and how they can act in the international realm. Basically, if institutions are as important as Ikenberry writes, and the US and Russia are not actively forming them, this would mean the relationship, while not necessarily adversarial, must be abnormal according to Ikenberry’s theory.

Second, Russia presents the US with important issues crucial to both countries’ security and well-being. Although Russia is not the power it used to be, it is still the largest country on the globe with a large proportion of the global population and much of the world’s nuclear weapons. A Russia plagued by internal instability and bordered by unstable countries poses a security threat to itself and the rest of the world. Important issues such as nuclear safety and the looming HIV/AIDS crisis are cases for potential cooperation and institution building between the US and Russia. The US must find a way to deal with crucial issues such as this, and if institutions that could potentially be helpful are not being formed, it would be helpful to better understand why.

Third, the case of power disparity is not unique to the US-Russian case. The US is arguably more powerful than all other nations in the world, and it is important for both the US and these weaker nations to find effective ways to cooperate over common
concerns, particularly when common security interests are at stake. Preferably the US would do this without simply dominating other countries and telling them what to do.

**Preliminary Answer**

Based on my initial thinking and reading, it appears that Ikenberry's theory does not seem to apply to the US-Russia case because the power disparity is different from how it appears. I anticipate that the apparent superiority of the US over Russia is weakened by Russia's perception (delusion?) of power combined with its actual remaining power (e.g., nuclear), and this might be enough to prevent power disparities from driving the two countries to build institutions. It appears that rather than driving for institutions to keep the US from dominating the relationship, Russia has instead tried to push the US for concessions in order to preserve or create a semblance of power parity between the two nations. Russian pride does not seem to permit extensive institution building because this could be perceived as a weakness.

**Competing Answers/Interpretations**

In searching for an explanation for the lack of prominence of institution building between the US and Russia after the Cold War, I see five main possible explanations.

First, perhaps great disparities in power in a post-war environment does not drive institution building between states. Although it seems impossible that someone could argue that Ikenberry's other characteristic of post-war relations, uncertainty, is not
present, perhaps the US and Russia are not as unequal as it is perceived. Perhaps Russia's size, history as a great power, and nuclear weapons are enough to make up for its evident weakness in almost all areas. It is also possible that Russia's perception of power is enough to alter the effects of the power disparity. This could explain the apparent absence of drive to build institutions.

Second, perhaps disparities in power are present, but they do not drive institution building. Or, third, perhaps uncertainties do not drive the building of institutions. It is possible that one of these characteristics, though present, is essentially irrelevant to the US-Russia case, which would explain the lack of institution building.

A fourth explanation would argue that the Cold War was not final enough to be considered a true post-war juncture. If this "war" did not end with a final defeat of Russia in battle, perhaps Ikenberry's theory works best for more definitive wars. Those who do not see the Cold War as a definitive US victory and a Russian loss would defend this argument.

A final explanation would argue that it is not in the interest of both the US and Russia to build institutions.

**Approach to Research**

In order to examine closely the US-Russian relationship in the last decade, I will research all attempts (and absence of attempts) for institutionalization between the US and Russia during these years. I hope to gain a sense of the “track record” for institutionalization between these two countries. After this research, I will likely be able
to find several "categories" of relations to highlight between the US and Russia to use as case studies for US-Russian relations such as dealing with former Soviet nuclear materials and space exploration. I have done extensive research this summer on the security implications of Russia's HIV/AIDS crisis, so I am considering this as a possible case study. Wallander's book should provide a good model for this type of case analysis. If it turns out that the US-Russia relationship is governed largely by Russian perceptions of its power, I will need to read into this literature as well.

My goal will not be to determine whether or not there was "enough" institutionalization between the US and Russia to meet Ikenberry's qualifications for a high level of institution building because it is not an easily quantifiable science for which he gives a specific number of institutions needed in order to qualify a relationship as "highly institutionalized." I am much more interested in knowing why the US and Russia do not present a defense of Ikenberry's theory when signs of power disparity and uncertainty point toward a drive for institution building. I hope to explore cases in which institutions were formed which did not prosper and cases when they were not formed or resisted to better understand this relationship and the role of institutions in the relationships between these seemingly unequal states.

**Resources Available at Dartmouth**

At the Dartmouth Library, I have found many books on Russian and US foreign policy and international organization. Using Dartmouth's online digital collections and hard copy periodicals collections, I have access to the theoretical literature. Dartmouth's government documents collection will also give me transcripts of Congressional
Committee meetings. Publications from think tanks and international organizations are also readily available on the internet.
Preliminary Bibliography


- This book analyzes the consequences of nuclear leakage to US national security. It argues that the US has no good defense once materials are smuggled, therefore we must prevent the materials from being smuggled in the first place to ensure US security.


- The authors of this book argue that it is not necessary to exaggerate the threat of nuclear terrorism, but the US should be very aware of the dangers. The book describes recent actions by various terror groups and explores the debate over what is to be done.


- I will form my argument around the theory Ikenberry describes here about the institutionalizing of states after major wars. It is also valuable as an explanation of institutionalist theory.


- This is a report from the 1980s evaluating the chances of nuclear terrorism. The authors argue that there was definite danger, but still the probability for nuclear terrorism was still low. Using this source, I can analyze how the dangers have changed.


- This report of the CSIS finds that in order to ensure security, the US must instigate a new program to purchase highly enriched plutonium and uranium from Russia as well as consolidating the nuclear materials that are in Russia. This is a persuasive policy paper arguing that the US must do more to secure the “loose nukes” in Russia.

- This PONARS policy paper describes the history of threats of nuclear power plant seizures in Russia. It highlights the basic reasons for which we should be concerned about the “loose nukes” problem, what actions should be taken, and the limitations of Russia and the US in the fight against this threat.


- This study evaluates the actions of the US Department of Energy in the implementation of MPC&A regulations. It states that implementation has been irregular, yet effective where it has been done.


- Although I will find more recent articles on this topic, this one gives a detailed description of the state of Russian nuclear cities fallen into decline since the end of the Cold War. Understanding these nuclear cities is key to my understanding of the security danger.


- This book offers a detailed account of US-Russian relations from the end of the Cold War until today. Despite the fact that the story is told only from one side (from the perspective of one of Clinton’s aids), this source is valuable for obtaining a sense of the flow of events of the last decade of relations. It includes in the back a chronology of relations 1991-2001.


- Taylor argues that Russia is falling into such extreme social and political ruin that it is becoming “strategic[ally] irrelevant.” This article describes the problems in Russia that have likely contributed to the decreased security of nuclear materials and also serves as an opposing opinion, one that argues for Russia’s irrelevancy.


- The Congressional hearings in this record concluded that the threat of “loose nukes” in Russia is one of the most serious security threats to the US for the next few decades.

- Wallander attempts to apply institutionalist theory to German-Russian relations after the Cold War. This account will be valuable as a source of comparison to US-Russian relations. Also, the issues explored in this book that were important to German-Russian relations were likely also important to US-Russian relations, such as the decline of Russian power and the threats posed by Russia’s nuclear capabilities and materials. I can also use it as a model for the application of institutionalist theory to interstate relations.
John Young

Senior Honors Thesis Proposal

Government Department
1. Research Topic

The American Constitution contains certain anti-majoritarian measures for the purpose of protecting minority groups from the possible malevolence of a majority, or, more broadly, to protect democracy from itself. Yet this commitment agreed upon in 1781 continues to limit the power of successive generations who were never consulted on the particulars of the document which spells out their political rights and obligations. More generally, agreements between groups and states are expected to possess moral weight beyond the lifetime of those who signed and consented to them. Likewise, attempts are often made to rectify (or demand rectification of) injustices committed in the past through reparations or the provision of special rights. For example, it is accepted that some Native Americans have exclusive claims to land rights by virtue of descending from those whose land was stolen by European colonists. Many burdens and responsibilities are passed on to present generations by the actions and will of past generations who are now long gone.

Conversely, concerns about resource depletion have lately raised the related issue of justice for posterity. Depending on one’s theory of justice, future generations may be owed the bare minimum to survive or as much as the present generation can pass on without crippling itself. With a present generation’s duties to future generations may come its right to constrain those future generations to certain rules and bind them to correct injustices unresolved by the present generation. Janna Thompson argues that what we can reasonably expect to constrain future generations is also what we owe to past generations.
Theories of justice often appeal to idealized circumstances and relations between individuals. John Rawls invents an original position filled with equal contemporaries with no knowledge of their constitutive attachments. Robert Nozick's theory of distributive justice postulates that, given an initially just distribution of resources, any combination of just transactions will result in a just outcome even if some individuals are worse off because they poorly manage their resources. Breaking out from these idealized circumstances is a challenge faced by theories of justice, especially when applied across generations. Under the Rawlsian difference principle, it is unclear who is the least well-off, given the indeterminacy of future generations. Likewise, a Rawlsian original position would, if held today, seem to preclude the acceptance of past burdens but would instead attempt to create the most just situation given present circumstances. Nozick's theory may be just within a generation, but expanding it across generations prevents any assistance to those born into terrible circumstances due to their parents' mismanagement, even without any injustice having occurred. Hugh McCormick points out that any reciprocity-based theory of justice seems to break down once it is applied across generations because past generations are immune from a present generation's actions whereas future generations depend greatly upon today's.

2. Question

Intergenerational justice is a serious test to any theory of justice, and an issue modern society struggles with, whether in the form of claims from the past or duties to the future. There must be just grounds on which a present generation follows contracts made by earlier ones or attempts to remedy any injustice committed by them. There must also be criteria for what is owed to future generations and what burdens can be passed on
to them. What obligations can be inherited from past generations and what obligations are there to future ones? Is there some theory of justice that can account for just relations between generations?

3. Importance and Interest

This topic is important for at least three reasons.

First, many claims by disadvantaged minorities depend on historical injustices. Reparations have been made to Jews affected by WWII; aboriginal peoples in ex-colonies often have received, or now demand, special rights and restitution in large part because their land was stolen by colonists. Any attempt at just and effective adjudication of these claims requires a mechanism for determining which claims are valid and how to satisfy those claims that are. It is obvious to most that historical injustices have caused persistent inequalities between communities but the correct solution is not as obvious. At first blush, it seems reasonable to attempt to redistribute resources held by the present generation to a distribution that would have obtained had a particular set of injustices not occurred.

However, Jeremy Waldron demonstrates that this runs into difficulties in counterfactual reasoning. It is difficult to make moral judgments based on best guesses as to what would have happened, especially given that what would have happened is subject to the choices made by individuals with free will. Furthermore, even if a best estimate could be agreed upon, the dispossession of resources from those who have benefited from a historical injustice is troublesome in itself. Would it be reasonable to require all non-aboriginal peoples to leave North America? This line of reasoning demonstrates the inherent difficulties of making such judgments, and the necessity of a more nuanced approach to the issue of intergenerational justice.
Second, changing circumstances through generations affects the adequacy of certain agreements. For example, the commerce clause and penumbra rights have been used time and again to change the meaning of the US constitution (or perhaps discover its true meaning). It is clear that Supreme Court decisions broadly track evolving societal standards and that even the definition of what is constitutional has changed. Another example is the treaty between the Maori and the British, which Judith Pryor explains is in part the basis for New Zealand’s law, but its significance and meaning are now hotly contested. Some agreements were not even signed in good faith, or were broken long ago. Society does depend on and abide by some inherited contracts, but others have long been ignored or altered beyond recognition. A good theory of intergenerational justice can lend insight into determining which agreements are binding, how to amend one’s understanding of an agreement in changing circumstances, or what role there is for agreements broken in the past.

Finally, pressing environmental or resource concerns and potentially destructive technological innovation have drastically increased a present generation’s ability to affect future generations. Rasmus Karlsson argues that this asymmetry in intergenerational power brings to bear questions of intergenerational justice. In our approach to nuclear weapons, resource depletion, or human cloning it is important to understand how their effects will manifest themselves in future generations. The threats (or benefits, in some cases) can disproportionately affect people who are not alive yet and will be unable to have input on the pertinent decisions. A sophisticated understanding of intergenerational justice can inform our decision today and allow us to properly account for future preferences.
4. Preliminary Answer/Interpretation

Our intuitions tell us that it is inappropriate to leave nothing to our children, just as they tell us that abiding by agreements and remedying injustices are moral requisites. The difficulty, of course, lies in extending those intuitions through generations and determining the substance of what they require. At least one critical issue must be resolved in order to address these difficulties.

How far is our identity wrapped up in our group membership? In an imagined society where identity is entirely atomistic except with concern to generation, historical claims could not exist. Someone otherwise born into what was once a disadvantaged group could simply join the advantaged group without any loss. That land was taken from Native Americans 200 years ago is irrelevant today because “Native Americanness” is not a constitutive part of anyone’s self in this imagined society, and their ancestors’ way of life is no longer possible is only morally relevant in the sense that there is now one less lifestyle option for everyone (but many new, morally equal possible ones). But this is not the case, as evidenced by the persistence of cultures even under continuous assault and the passage of values and grievances from one generation to the next within a group. The same argument can be made for agreements between associations. If a state is considered a continuous moral body through time, then its obligations persist through generations. If it is simply an association of those individuals present at any particular time, then its duties and obligations disappear with the death of those persons and a new association supplants the old. If group membership and identity are not entirely fungible, then claims of intergenerational justice are permissible.
Claims of injustice, though, are very limited. Counterfactual reasoning cannot adequately explain what would have been, and any possible answer is further limited by the expectations grown out of the injustice. For example, if B steals jewelry from A, melts it down and sells it to C at a good price, A's claim is against B, the perpetrator, not C, the current possessor. Asking people today to pay for historical injustices is tantamount to asking C's children to repay A's children. However, descendants of victims are still disadvantaged today, so it seems reasonable to rectify those injustices insofar as it is justified with appeals to principles of equality that would apply to any disadvantaged individual.

Likewise, assuming group membership holds currency, treaties and agreements between associations and states are legitimate through time. Hugh McCormick argues that duties are passed in a chain through overlapping generations and the possibility of reciprocal relations between generations existing at the same time. Stephen Holmes concludes similarly that restrictions on the sovereignty of a future generation are passed on through the benefits bestowed by the previous generation. Just as one owes any debts associated with an inherited estate, so do those inheriting a working state take on the duties made by the state. However, these types of duties are not absolute because different circumstances affect the relevancy or justness of some agreements, there is some flexibility and evolution in group membership, and many standing agreements could be considered unjust in the first place.

Finally, some sort of principle of equality of opportunity must apply in our duties to future generations. Choices now that restrict the ability of any and all future generations to control their own destinies are unjust. For example, a nuclear holocaust or
the depletion of all non-renewable resources would be unjust because it would prevent any future generation from pursuing any version of the good life. Likewise, burdensome and excessive contracts or agreements placing especially heavy duties upon future generations would be unjust because they would unnecessarily limit sovereignty. Some depletion of resources is allowable, however, because each generation has claim to its fair share and can use resources to improve technology and infrastructure which benefits all future generations. By the same token, treaties and agreements that protect relations between people are allowable because they benefit and ensure (hopefully) peaceable relations between people of all generations, even if some intermediate generation is opposed. Stephen Holmes reasons that an agreement can restrict the sovereignty of one generation to protect the sovereignty of all others.

5. Competing Answers/Interpretations

Janna Thompson argues for a stronger reparative approach because of the importance of memory and psychology for groups that goes beyond the theft of property. A group that has historically been discriminated against suffers more than economic damage and recognition of those injustices and attempts at redress are required as a sign of respect for those groups. Additionally, she attacks the idea that historical injustices are discrete injustices; rather the theft of land is an ongoing injustice as long as the land is unreturned.

Jeremy Waldron takes the opposite approach and believes that the only justice that is relevant is justice for present and future generations. Such an approach allows reparation only insofar as it is consistent with some other theory of justice that seeks to alleviate inequalities today. The right to redress of wrongs is not inheritable. Partially this
is because of the impossibility of sound counterfactual reasoning. Even putting aside the difficulty in establishing the likely alternative world, one cannot assign morality based on choices people would have made, but never did.

Thomas Jefferson argued that a constitutional convention should be held every 19 years (the length of a generation, in his estimate) because the requirements of democracy and sovereignty disallowed the passage of duties between generations. It is a strong argument that each generation should decide for itself what rules should govern society. The idea of implied consent may not be strong, because even if a newly of-age member disagrees with some constitutional elements or treaties signed by his state, she has little choice but to accept them; and even if she were to raise a majority of her compatriots to oppose them, antidemocratic measures taken by prior generations could stop her.

6. Research Approach

Intergenerational justice is a multileveled topic. First, I will research basic theories of justice, including those espoused by Rawls, Nozick, Karl Marx, and others. As mentioned earlier, I will look into scholarship on identity. The debate between communitarians and liberals is a good starting point, as is the rich body of literature I am working through as a part of Government 86: Multiculturalism with Professor Swaine. It is unlikely that any one theory of justice or concept of identity will be able answer the questions posed by intergenerational justice.

Instead, I will look through the scholarly literature on intergenerational justice and analyze how they apply concept of self and ideas of justice to make their arguments. Finally, I will attempt to consolidate the variety of answers and common threads into one theory of relations between generations that can guide policy questions on how to deal
with inherited burdens and duties to the future. The indeterminacy of the future, along with the problematic nature of counterfactual analysis of the past, may prevent a holistic completion of this endeavor. It could turn out that rules of justice for dealing with the past injustice are very different from rules of justice for the future, and that both are distinct from inherited contracts. To conclude, I will attempt to apply my work to such topics as environmental justice, reparations for African Americans, and Constitutional entrenchment.

7. **Resources available at Dartmouth College**

The Dartmouth Library and its access to a treasure trove of scholarly journals will give me all the access I need to authors and thinkers who are concerned with this issue of generational justice. Likewise, a number of professors in the government department specialize in areas that are highly relevant to my discussion. Professor Lebow led my FSP to London and works heavily in counterfactuals and international relations. Professor Bedi taught me in a Government 60 class on free speech and is very knowledgeable about law and rights. Finally, Professor Swaine, my advisor, thoroughly understands competing theories of justice and conceptions of the self. I plan to depend heavily on these professors and others to guide me in my work, and on the Dartmouth Library to assist my research and collection of literature.
8. Annotated Bibliography


Barkan looks at examples of injustice and attempts to rectify them by perpetrating groups. Liberal individual rights often conflict with group rights. In order to proceed with any meaningful restitution, states must recognize slighted groups and their right to make claims. Apology and recognition can assuage the guilt of perpetrators of historical injustice, or simply maintain the image of a just society. Restitutions aim should be to fix existing inequalities.


Rigidity in constitutions may very well protect future generations from current ones, but also limits the sovereignty of future generations. The problem is that the constituting generation imposes rules on people who have not and cannot be consulted. On the other hand, rigidity is desirable within a generation and because generations overlap, it is a necessary side effect for a constitution to have intergenerational rigidity. This is good though, because it allows one generation to constrain a future generation which might otherwise hurt an even later one. Nevertheless, the future generations should have representation today.


Constitutions are fundamentally antagonistic to democracy because they constrict majoritarian rule. Particularly, they bind future generations to rules they were not consulted on. However, one generation can bind the next insofar as the next generation inherits a right from the previous generation. With an inherited estate come all its debts. Thus by inheriting a full state, generations tacitly consent to the rules of that state. Holmes explores other facets of precommitment, including committing ones own will.


A Rawlsian view of just savings maintains that each generation ought to contribute its fair share to the overall well being, according to the agreement of the Original Position. This is a symmetrical form of justice, where each generation has equivalent power to shape the future. Technological innovation has created asymmetries whereby present generations have immense power to severely limit the options available to future generations through destruction or resource depletion. This asymmetry must be rectified with political institutions.


There is a difference between immigrants and national minorities and the types of claims they can justly make, because national minorities can be seen as having the right of self-determination, reflecting the historical fact that they did not as a group give up
said right, as immigrants do. States should follow historical agreements made with minorities to maintain legitimacy and respect self-determination rights. However, it is somewhat arbitrary to assign rights in this manner because some groups never had opportunities to make such agreements or were forced into them. Likewise, they can lose force with changing circumstances. Historical agreements alone are insufficient to exercise claims.


Theories of Justice that depend on a reciprocity criterion seem to break down when applied between generations because “future generations are asymmetrically vulnerable” to present generations. However, generations do overlap and due the “degenerative features of the human condition” older generations are vulnerable to their immediate successors. Because reciprocal claims can be linked between a number of overlapping generations, a chain of justice is formed whereby what one generation owes to the next is in part the resources necessary for the next generation to fulfill its duties to even later generations.


Torpey edits a multi-author work with theoretical frameworks for reparation politics and case studies. Obsession with the past should not cloud concerns for present and future injustice. Inequalities today can be traced directly to injustices yesterday, in the way that wealth and social attitudes move between generations. Calculating appropriate benefits is tricky at best and runs into counterfactual difficulty.


The disagreement between historical arguments for property rights and end-state arguments misses how they work together. Certain end-state concerns lay out the limits of fair shares and rights to acquire property, but within those limits any holdings are just insofar as they were acquired justly. Counterfactual difficulties with rectifying historical injustice can be dismissed by holding all else constant and assuming the closest pattern of events to the actual history, but with the exclusion of the injustice. A right to have injustice rectified can pass down through tribe or children, in a form that best approximates the world without the injustice, but within the current end-state limits on fair shares.


A ‘reciprocal’ relationship of justice is formed whereby a present generation’s entitlement to bind and reasonably expect future generations to accept those duties and obligations requires a present generation to respect duties and obligations imposed by past generations. This is not supposed to bind present generations to agreements that were (are) unfair, nor preclude them from accepting duties arising without any formalized agreement, such as the rectification of injustice. These obligations are passed by citizenship (group membership) rather than through blood. The arguments espoused by
Waldron are insufficient to deny historical based claims because present equity based claims do not always override prior commitments.


Justice cannot simply be between contemporaries; nations and families are intergenerational beings. What present generations are entitled to demand of future generations is what the present also owes to the past. Members of groups discriminated against in the past do have legitimate claims, because past wrongs still has repercussions today. Certain cultural claims to land are stronger than others because of longstanding connection between a culture and its sacred sites. The question of inheritance, both of duties and of claims against others is a difficult one, and hard to justify under egalitarian principles of justice.


Reparative claims which seek to rectify a discrete injustice in the past fall into the trap of counterfactual ambiguity. Any such claims require an effort to reshape the world as it would have been had the injustice (and even all injustices) not occurred, but guesswork is no grounds for morality. If instead reparative claims are based on the remittance of a continuing injustice (e.g., if a tribe is still dispossessed of a prized burial ground) the claim is stronger. Still, such claims fall victim to the passage of time as the new distribution is critical to descendants of those who may have committed the injustice. Claims of justice are vulnerable to changes in circumstance, so even if a wrong is committed, the situation that persists because of it may now be right, based on such changes in circumstance.

**9. Expanded Bibliography (Other relevant sources previously read or unable to acquire)**


Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government

Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia


Government Department Honors Program:
Thesis Proposal

What is your research topic?

What makes a citizen vote the way he or she does? Since the days of Downs’ median voter theorem, voting studies have gained sophistication in terms of both the questions scholars ponder and the methodology used to answer those questions. With the growth of an extensive body of voting studies literature, scholars have attempted to differentiate and finely examine specific criteria that citizens use to vote for political candidates.

Within the larger body of voting studies, economic voting has been a field explored with particular depth. Economic voting studies ask a deceptively simple question: how does the economy affect the way citizens cast their votes? Several main types of economic voting have been hypothesized and empirically studied. First, theories about the scope of economic perceptions have garnered extensive study: “Sociotropic voting” occurs when a voter’s perspective of the economy as a whole affects how his or her vote is cast whereas “pocketbook voting” or “egocentric voting” purports that a voter’s personal financial situation influences vote choices (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, Kiewiet 1983). Along another axis, the timeframe affecting economic voting has also been studied: “retrospective voting” theories posit past ideas about the economy will influence voter choice, whereas “prospective voting” theories support the claim that people vote based on their projections for a candidate’s potential future influence over the economy (Key 1966, MacKuen et al 1992).

Simple terminology aside, economic voting has proven to be both a fascinating and complex field of study. Numerous studies have contradicted each other, and many times results have defied logic. Morris Fiorina aptly summed economic voting studies when he commented on his own study of midterm elections:

Exactly half the coefficients have the wrong sign, and two of these anomalies attain statistical significance... we find evidence that economic retrospective voting only among a subset of Democrats who perceive their economic situations have improved. All in all this analysis provides little support for the traditional view that midterm elections constitute a referendum on the incumbent administration’s handling of the economy (1978, 435)

Fiorina’s subsequent studies of economic voting concluded that economic voting was spread evenly across different subsets of the population (1981). Soon afterwards, Kinder and Kiewiet (1979 and 1981) were the first to substantively challenge the predominance of egocentric voting assumptions. They subsequently produced analysis supporting a theory of sociotropic voting with the caveat that sociotropic voting should not be equated with altruistic voting. In the years since these seminal studies by Fiorina, Kinder and Kiewiet, the academic fire has been fueled with more advanced studies of economic voting. Most recently, Nagler and Niemann (1997) and Nagler and DeBoef (1999) argued that the economy differently affects different economic groups. In casting their ballots, these subsets of the population
employ economic evaluations of various scopes and timeframes as related to specific groups such as

Regardless of the varying scholarly claims, however, the basic idea of economic voting resonates
richly with the public. Simply examine two prominent – and by all means successful – presidential
campaign taglines: “Are you better off today than you were four years ago?” and “It’s the economy,
 stupid.”

Given the rich literature and speculation behind economic voting, I would like to explore a
particular subset of the population. I propose to study the changing voting criteria of women. Quite
specifically, I propose to study the patterns of how women have engaged in economic voting on the
presidential level over the past several decades, particularly in relation to women’s work force
participation. I choose the presidential level because it provides a uniform series of candidates and
national economic situations with which to work.

And more specifically, what is the question you will examine?

My question is as follows: as women have entered the work force, have they begun to vote
differently? Specifically, have they become more likely to engage in economic voting? Have women
become more inclined to incorporate economic indicators into their vote choices, as they have become
more salient economic actors? Specific variables and data used for such an empirical analysis will be
discussed shortly.

Scholars have done little to explore this particular question, but the body of literature in related
fields is quite extensive. Literature regarding the “gender gap” in politics is particularly rich fodder for
exploring my topic. Gender gap literature has extensively studied women’s workforce participation,
political participation, political knowledge, and economic voting. Melding together these bodies of
literature, I plan to explore what changes in women’s patterns of economic voting as they have entered
the workforce. My reasoning is as follows.

First, without a doubt, women have become highly participatory in the labor force in the past fifty
years. In 1950, only thirty-three percent of women over the age of sixteen worked outside the home. By
1980, this figure had increased to more than fifty-one percent (Andersen and Cook, 1985). During the
1950s, young women (ages 16-24) tended to work until they married, at which point they would exit the
labor force. More than ever, young women have remained in school for longer periods of time, entered
the labor force, and become fully participant economic actors even while married and having children.
Furthermore, more families are dual-income households, and more women have become the single earner
in one-parent households. Some academics have hypothesized that “women’s increasing education and
labor force involvement have led to rates of political activity equal to or exceeding men” (Hansen 1997).
McDonagh (1982) assumes a position subtly differentiated from Hansen, purporting that “social status
variables [such as family income or status within the community] are more important determinants [than
work force participation] when accounting for women’s political participation patterns.” However, the
balance of literature claims that a woman’s participation in the labor force is a variable affecting her
political ideas and participation. Given this starting point, I naturally question how labor force participation affects women’s economic voting.

Second, gender-based voting studies abound. Given the extensive gender gap literature, Daniel Wirls (1986) categorized the gender gap into four elements: “the participation gap, policy opinion gap, electoral gap, and partisan gap.” Gender gap studies tend to focus on specific types of issue stances, party ID, and voting choice (Block 1985, Frankovic 1982, Mansbridge 1985, Matlack 1987, Poole and Zeigler 1985, Shapiro and Mahajan 1986, Wirls 1986). For example, men tend to favor the use of force in international engagements while women do not; and women place greater importance on issues such as health care and education than do men (Trevor 1999; Jennings and Farah, 1980). Women are also, in general, more likely to be Democrats than are men, and men are more likely to be self-declared Independents (Norrande 1997). Women tend to favor more liberal spending and taxing policies than do men. These descriptions are various elements of the gender gap.

Third, societal changes have naturally prompted the question “is the gender gap shifting?” Some evidence seems to provide a conclusive yes. Hansen (1997) claimed that over the past fifty years, women have become more politically engaged than ever before, and the gender gap in voting participation rates disappeared around the 1980 election (Wirls 1986). Controlling for education and income, women now vote in approximately proportional numbers to men. Andersen (1975) showed that employed women were particularly likely to vote. However, parity in ballot-box participation has not eradicated the gender gap, and Verba (1997) asserts that women are generally less politically engaged, informed, and efficacious than are men. A small body of literature regarding gender differences in political sophistication and participation generally supports Verba’s claims.

Fourth and finally, a small number of academics have studied the effect of gender upon economic voting. This coterie is small and dominated by Welch and Hibbings (1992). Acknowledging the results of gender gap studies, Welch and Hibbings state: “If there are significant differences in the way men and women evaluate candidates, parties, and issues, there may also be substantial variation in how men and women weigh these evaluations in making voting choices. Men and women may base their votes on quite different factors.” In their study of the 1980 and 1984 elections of Ronald Reagan, they find just such gender differences in how voting decisions are made and demonstrate that men cast egocentric, retrospective votes whereas women are more likely to cast sociotropic votes. Controlling for income and education, they still found their claims to be significant, though they admit that some of their sample sizes verged on being too small to guarantee significance. Additionally, Welch and Hibbings propose that women engage less overall in economic voting than do men. Why? Socialization of women is a popular answer among more qualitative researchers who study gender roles and their ramifications for society (Sapiro 1983; Elshain 1974 and 1987; Stoper and Johnson 1977; Bernard 1977).

How might women’s labor force participation interact with economic voting? In another seminal study that will be a cornerstone of this thesis, Poole and Zeigler (1985) argued that women’s lower participation in the workforce makes them less likely to engage in economic voting. Yet society is in the process of redefining women’s social roles and changing their resources, information, and labor force participation rates. This is why I intend to study the question: as women have entered the workforce.
have they become more likely than in past to engage in economic voting? Empirically, the dependent “y” variable is some measure of vote choice, while independent “x” variables are interactions among labor force status, gender and economic indices (both objective economic figures and subjective perception-of-economy indicators). Objective economic indicators would include statistics such as growth and unemployment, whereas subjective indicators would probe voters’ perceptions of the economy with questions such as “has the economy become better or worse in the last twelve months?” and “has your family’s economic situation become better or worse in the past year?”

While my question appears to be a straightforward inquiry, I imagine that the process of divining an answer will become quite complex, as numerous variables will have to be both controlled for and examined as important factors in their own right.

Most obviously, looking at women as a homogenous bloc of voters could prove to be less then enlightening. That being said, I will also examine how subgroups of women have engaged in economic voting over time. Here are just a few examples of important variables and sub-questions I intend to explore as related to study of gender and economic voting:

(1) First and most obviously, does an individual woman’s employment status affect whether or not she engaged in economic voting? For a moment, assume a positive correlation between women’s economic voting and overall female labor force participation. It is possible that societal changes in women’s labor force participation on the whole have prompted women to become more likely to engage in economic voting – and it is also possible that only employed women have become more likely to engage in economic voting.

(2) If possible, I will also examine full versus part-time employment.

(3) Do married women differ from unmarried, divorced, or widowed women in terms of whether they engage in economic voting, and how does workforce participation factor into this?

(4) How does political party affect economic voting among women over time, as related to workforce participation?

(5) How does age (the generation in which a woman was raised) affect the likelihood that she will engage in economic voting, dependent upon her status in the labor force?

(6) How does economic status shift the data?

(7) What about the presence of children in the family as related to labor market participation?

(8) Education levels, number of years spent in the workforce, ethnicity, and numerous other variables will also be examined.

(9) I will also examine economic voting during economic recessions and booms. Do men and women adjust levels of economic voting in a similar fashion given shifting economic climates? Some evidence says that when women do employ economic voting, they tend to evaluate the economy more harshly than do men (Welch and Hibbing 1992).

Why is it important and interesting?

My proposed thesis topic is important and interesting because it will serve as one additional, small clue in solving the enigmatic riddle “How do citizens decide how to cast their ballots?”
Thus far, the literature has examined economic voting by race, gender, religion, social status, income, education, and numerous other factors. However, no systematic study has examined how long-term changes in one subcategory's participation as an economic actor has influenced that group's proclivity to engage in economic voting.

If we are to understand how people decide for whom they will vote, it is imperative that we study not just static situations (i.e., do men vote more heavily based upon their perceptions of the economy than do women?) but that we carefully examine dynamic situations as well. Increasing female participation in the workplace has generated indisputable changes in American culture and society. Intuition would lead any student of political science to question whether one of the resultant changes is the propensity for women to engage in economic voting as they have become more salient economic actors, meaning active members of the paid labor force. Over the past "x" years, has there been a statistically significant increase in the propensity of women to engage in any type of economic voting?

Finally, the questions I propose to examine may have import for future vote studies, and implications and applications beyond the narrow academic study of economic voting. Political candidates and policy experts alike may benefit from a better understanding of the changing nature of American woman's perception of the economy and how she applies this to her vote for the president.

What is your (preliminary) answer to the question or interpretation of the text?

I hypothesize that, on the presidential level, over the past "x" years women have become more likely to engage in economic voting as they have entered the workplace. That is, I theorize that as women have become more active members of the labor force, they have become more inclined to incorporate into their vote choices economic indicators and opinions. In theory, Poole and Zeigler (1985) seem to concur. Additionally, studies showing that employed women tended to engage in economic voting slightly more frequently that did non-employed women in the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections (Welch and Hibbing 1992). Given my limited information and exposure to the data, at this point I intend to structure my hypothesis as such: as women have entered the workforce and become more salient economic actors, they have become more likely to engage in economic voting. Over time, measures of women's economic voting will gain greater statistical significance. Given my area of inquiry, analysis might best advance using pooled cross-sections of data.

Of course, my answer is mostly intuitive, given that I have completed no data analysis as of yet. With a background in the literature, my intuition is as follows: as women have entered the workforce, they have become both more salient economic actors and more financially independent. Given these conditions, one would expect that women's electoral participation would increase (as it has) and that women's political sophistication would increase (also proven, see Verba 1997). More politically sophisticated, informed and wealthy people are hypothesized to be slightly more likely to cast sociotropic economic votes (Weatherford 1983). Given this assertion, I propose that women have become more likely to engage in sociotropic economic voting as they have entered the workforce and gained political sophistication and information along with greater economic independence. Perhaps women have become more attuned to economic changes and more acutely feel shifts in the economy, as they have become
more active labor participants. In short, I hypothesize that economic indicators have become stronger predictors of women's vote choice as women have become more active in the labor market. Empirically, this would be evidenced as, over time, women placing increased importance on economic indicators when voting. I propose that women have become more likely to engage in sociotropic economic voting both for the reasons explained above and because women in the aggregate are more politically liberal than are men. Political liberality seems to be associated more with sociotropic voting than with egocentric voting.

Additionally, more qualitative literature regarding socialization and gender relations helps structure my hypothesis. This literature holds that historically women have been socialized to engage less in political or independent economic pursuits, but that as society changes women have gained independence and engaged more independently and actively in politics (Sapiro 1983; Elshtain 1974 and 1987; Stoper and Johnson 1977; Bernard 1977). Circumstantial evidence for this point is certainly abundant in the ideological gap that has developed between men and women, with women tending more towards liberalism. But one could reasonably hypothesize that women's increasing independence and economic efficacy have produced a narrowing of the gender gap as related to economic voting.

What are the competing answers/interpretations?

I hypothesize that over time women have become more likely to engage in economic voting as they have entered the workforce in greater proportions than ever before. An alternate hypothesis could hold that women have not begun to engage more in economic voting, and that workforce participation has affected little change on voting criteria despite women's changing status and roles in society.

An alternate hypothesis could be that women's increasing independence may have caused a widening of the gender gap as related to economic voting. Certainly the changing roles of women in society seem to have promoted certain elements of the gender gap, as women become more independent actors. However, while women's workforce participation (a rough proxy for independence) has promoted a widening of the gender gap on certain policy issues and partisan affiliations, it would seem counterintuitive for women to engage less in economic voting as they gained economic independence.

How will you approach the research: case studies, large data sets, in-depth interviews, textual resources, primary sources?

I plan to use a two-pronged approach for my research. First, I plan to extensively study gender gap literature to better comprehend the rich history of gender-related political studies. With this background in more qualitative studies, I plan to embark on a rigorous statistical analysis using a large data set to examine quantitatively any changes in women's economic voting dependent upon workforce participation. I would like to integrate qualitative gender gap literature with quantitative economic voting studies to form a strong argument and solid thesis.

Without a doubt, large data sets will play a key role in my analysis. The National Election Study (NES) appears to be the most fitting, comprehensive, continuous, and cost-free data set available. Made available by the University of Michigan, the NES has been compiled over several decades and will provide an immense body of data with which to work. Thanks to its comprehensive nature, it asks
questions inquiring into numerous variables relevant to my proposed study. These questions include but are not limited to asking respondents about:

(1) Economic Perceptions:
   a. Most important problem facing the nation; How good a job does government do with the most important problem; Which party does best on the most important problem; Is the respondent financially better/worse off than one year ago; Will the respondent be financially better/worse off one year from now; Has national economy gotten better/worse in last year; Will national economy be better or worse in next 12 months

(2) Ideology and Political Interest:
   a. Women's role in business and government; 7-point scale; Liberal/conservative 7-point scale (self-placement); Liberal/conservative 7-point scale placement of President and Presidential Candidates; Follow public affairs; Interested in campaigns; Ever talk politics with family and friends

(3) Demographic and Lifestyle:
   a. Month, day, and year of birth; Marital Status; Highest grade of school or year of college completed; Work force status; Occupation; Work for self or others; Employed by federal, state or local government; How many hours work in average week is right amount; How worried about losing job in near future; Working now: out of work or laid off in last 6 months; During last 6 months, had reduction in work hours or pay cut; Anyone in household belong to labor union (who); Family income; Respondent's income; Main ethnic or nationality group; Father's (or head of households) occupation; Where grew up; How long lived in this community; How long lived in this dwelling unit; Own or rent
   b. Spouse: Highest grade or year of college; Work Force Status; Occupation
   c. Ever attend church; Ever think of self as part of church or denomination; Frequency of church services - every week or less; Attend church more often than once a week; Officially belong to parish, congregation or Temple; Attend/consider self Protestant, Roman Catholic or Jewish

The NES data appears to be the most comprehensive and far-reaching data available. Unfortunately, the NES has slightly shifted the wording on some of the questions over the years, so samples are not perfect reproductions of each other. However, the NES has taken great pains to produce strong and usable data. I plan to employ this data as the primary evidence in my investigation.

Professor Spiliotes is currently advocating that I use NES data to explore some initial statistics that track women and economic voting. For example, examine a few elections from the early 1960s and then several from the 1990s, and track changes in women's economic voting using cross-tabs and other measures. He has also suggested that I consider using several elections as individual case studies regarding particular sub-questions within my broader argument. From using cross-tabs and conducting initial analysis, I hope to proceed to regression analysis, potentially using pooled cross-sections of data, if I am able to employ a reasonably sophisticated methodology. In preparation for writing this thesis, I have
taken Econometrics (Economics 20) so that I will have some basic tools and knowledge to attempt such analysis.

What resources are available to you at Dartmouth that will help you in collecting your evidence?

Obviously, the Government department and all its supportive professors will serve as the greatest resource for me in the process of writing a thesis. Professor Spiliotes, as my advisor, and Professor Fowler, as someone with whom I have worked extensively, will be especially key resources for helping me shape, reshape, refine, and analyze all data and evidence. Additionally, I feel comfortable requesting additional help from economic professors if needed – especially Professors Andreas Bentz and Patty Anderson, who have been my instructors in Economics 1 and 21 (Bentz) and 20 (Anderson).

Additionally, the library and online data resources will be especially helpful in this endeavor. Online resources include Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, University of Michigan NES data, and online journals - just to name a few of the many resources.

Another key resource will be the Social Science Computing (SSC) lab in the basement of Silsby Hall. The student workers at the SSC lab are trained to assist fellow students with STATA and other computer statistical programs and their associated problems.

Overall, I feel confident that Dartmouth’s resources will be more than sufficient to guide me through the process of writing a thesis.
Annotated Bibliography


Using 1984 presidential level NES data, Abramowitz et al determine that egocentric voting is more prevalent among those who mentally link their personal financial situations to broader economic trends and government policies. People who do not attribute their personal financial situations to government macroeconomic policies are not likely to engage in egocentric economic voting. Abramowitz discusses the American propensity support economic individualism in the abstract but notes that, in practice, Americans often do attribute their financial situation at least partly to government economic policy. The greatest determinant for attribution was the direction of the change, with those respondents enjoying economic good times “congratulating” themselves for personal success while those enduring economic hardships tended to place blame on societal factors. As such, egocentric voting should be more prevalent during economic downturns.


Anderssen and Cook engage a cross-sectional comparison of employed women and housewives and find significant differences in political opinions, political involvement, and psychological variables such as self-esteem. Employing National Election Study data from 1972 through 1976, Andersen and Cook study women who participated in the labor force the entire time, those who remained non-employed throughout the survey, and those who entered the workforce between 1972 and 1976. They attempt to examine competing hypotheses of women’s self-selection and socialization into the workforce. Their findings indicate that entering the workforce has no absolute effect on women’s views of gender roles, time spent in the workforce may change level of political activity. This conception of time spent in the workforce rather than simple workforce status was a never-before addressed way to examine how work affects women’s political attitudes.


Anderson examines how the sex differences in political participation have narrowed over the period between 1952 and 1972. She determines that women who are employed outside the home participated in political activities at the same rate as do men, particularly in terms of election campaigns. Anderson examines that possibility that the socio-demographic changes among this group of women, coupled with the feminist movement and specific elements of the 1972 presidential campaign, have led to the increased political participation of employed women.


Chaney et al compare the voting behaviors of women and men in presidential elections from 1980 (the year researchers noticed a partisan gender gap) through 1992. They test whether men and women attribute different levels of salience to different issues and preferences in casting their votes for president, and whether or not this explains the gender gap. They employ a multivariate model to demonstrate that a combination of views on the economy, military issues, abortion, ideology, and social programs can consistently explain approximately three-quarters of the observed gender gap. They concur with Welch and Hibbing (1992) that women tend to vote more sociotropically whereas men do so more egocentrically. They also concur that women tend to evaluate the economy and their own economic situations more negatively than do men.

Duch et al examine the disparity of empirical findings regarding economic voting on the micro and macro levels, disputing the general assessment that survey data produces inconsistencies. Instead, building on the work of Bartels, they purport that public evaluations of the national economy vary systemically with information, media exposure, political attitudes, personal experiences, and demographic characteristics. As such, they provide a basis for challenging traditional research to open a line of questioning regarding gender, labor force participation, and economic voting.


Hansen explores a resource-based model of political participation and finds that women's increasing labor-force participation and increasing levels of education have led to rates of political activity on par with those of men. However, using logistical regression she finds that women still engage less in political proselytizing than do men. Hansen does examine women's lower levels of political efficacy but questions how women's changing levels of resources will shift efficacy. Hansen focuses specifically on how having a female candidate running for office differently motivates and mobilizes women to become involved in politics.


Kaufman and Petrocik hypothesize that the gender gap is a product of the changing politics of men. They examine gender differences in voting between 1952 and 1996 to form this hypothesis, then proceed with an analysis of 1992 and 1996 elections to explore two different sub-hypotheses: the attitude hypothesis holds that the gender gap results from underlying gender-based issues on policy matters, whereas the salience hypothesis suggests that men and women differently weigh their attitudes in making political decisions. Using a logit model, they determine that both attitude and salience play a role in the gender gap during the 1992 – 1996 period.


McDonagh investigates the claim that increased employment of women results in their higher levels of political participation. In exploring the interaction effects of social status and employment, McDonagh differentiates derived status from achieved status. Derived status is prestige based on one's spouse's job, and was employed to measure the status of housewives. Achieved status is prestige from one's own employment and is applicable to both employed men and women. McDonagh's results show that social status variables themselves – not individual employment status – are key determinants of a women's political participation patterns.


Mutz and Mondack argue that group-level economic perceptions may serve as a middle ground complementing theories of egocentric economic voting and sociotropic economic voting. They examine group membership, group identification, and group comparison and hypothesize that group perceptions beyond the level of the family but smaller than the nation as a whole influence vote choice. Using data on presidential votes from the 1984 South Bend Study, they employ logit models to explore group-level economic voting. Their findings support group-based voting but not based upon group membership or
identification. Instead, they find that sociotropic fairness is a key factor: voters are substantially more likely to judge the president favorably if they feel that class groups have enjoyed similar changes in economic standing.


Norrander’s exploration of the evolving gender gap makes several important assertions. First, using a longitudinal perspective, she agrees with previous research hypothesizing that the partisan gender gap evolved not as women became more liberal but as men more quickly exited the Democratic party, particularly in the South. Given this, Norrander suggests that the gender gap may differ by region. Furthermore, she suggests that the partisan gender gap emerged before the oft-cited 1980 election of Ronald Reagan. Men voted more for Republicans in 1968 and 1972 than did women. Finally, Norrander exposes the fact that men are much more likely to claim independent status than are women, who affiliate with a political party.


Poole and Zeigler explain the traditional gender gap in terms of specific types of issue stances, party identification, and voting choice. They also delve into some of the causes of the gender gap. As related to economic voting, Poole and Zeigler theorize that women’s lower participation levels in the workforce make them less likely to engage in economic voting of any kind.


Shapiro and Mahajan examine changes in policy preferences by gender from the 1960s to the 1980s by using a series of 267 repeated policy questions (962 time points). They find that traditionally understood gender differences such as “compassion issues” and use of force to be present, but that the aggregate policy opinion was changing as the salience of issues increased among women consistent with the goals of the women’s movement. This study examines the gender gap before it’s traditional 1980 beginning and brings to light how women’s political participation has changed their issue salience and the direction of public opinion.


Verba et al employ the Citizen Participation Study to determine that women are less politically interested, informed, and efficacious than are men, and that this gender gap in political engagement has ramifications for political participation. Once resource differences between the sexes are accounted for, however, the participation gap is greatly reduced. Verba et al contend that gender differences in political orientation are specific to politics rather than manifestations of greater differences in gender attributes. They test whether the idea that politics is a “man’s world” has attributed to the participation gap and find mixed results.


Welch and Hibbings explore the differences between men and women in their levels and types of economic voting. As they predicted, women are less likely to engage in economic voting than are men. However, women are more likely to engage in a certain aspect of economic voting: sociotropic voting. Men are more likely to engage in egocentric voting. Welch and Hibbings control for socioeconomic differences between the genders and arrive at the same determination. As such, they hypothesize that
men and women not only have different political attitudes but that they operationalize these attitudes differently to provide a differing basis for political action.


Wiris argues for a different definition of the "gender gap" than has commonly been seen in the literature. Commonly, the gender gap was described as women's rejection of Reagan's new conservatism and attraction to the more liberal politics of the Democratic party. Wiris argues that men have left the Democratic party whereas women have maintained the same affiliations to a greater degree. Wiris introduces a valuable tool for dissembling the gender gap into four separate elements: the participation gap, the policy opinion gap, the electoral gap, and the partisan gap. Wiris argues for a dynamic, multi-dimensional view of the gender gap and briefly addresses men's and women's views on the economy and economic policy.
1) Research Topic

In recent years, there has been a great deal of literature focusing on the revolution in military affairs (RMA). Some theorists argue that the end of the 20th century has been marked by a profound revolution in military affairs due to advent of technologically advanced weaponry and the importance of computers in military conflict. However, there has been a great deal of debate surrounding the effects of various types of technology in military conflicts and the effects of technology on states' propensity for military conflict. The topic that I am going to examine is the role that technology plays in states' propensity for war and the role that technology plays in war outcomes. In addition, I plan to look at how technology contributes to states' perceptions of their military capabilities and how such perceptions affect states' propensity for war. The paper will examine these issues within the framework of existing literature on the nature of the offense-defense balance and the role of technology in modern warfare. I will also briefly look at some specific advancements in military technology, such as nuclear weapons, precision guided weaponry and cyber-attacks for additional implications that new technological capabilities are having on modern warfare.

2) Questions of Examination

The main question that I am going to examine is whether or not states' technological military capabilities/perceived technological superiority affects a state's propensity to engage in conflict. In addition, I will look at how a state's technological military capabilities (both actual and perceived) affect the types of conflicts in which states engage. Here are the questions that I plan on examining:

Question 1: Are states that have or believe they have greater relative technological military capabilities more or less likely to engage in military conflict?
1a: During periods of offense dominance?
1b: During periods of defense dominance?

Question 2: Are states that have or believe they have lesser relative technological military capabilities more or less likely to engage in military conflict?
2a: During periods of offense dominance?
2b: During periods of defense dominance?

Question 3: How do technological military capabilities affect war outcomes?

Question 4: Does the possession of certain types of technological capability work to inflate states perceptions of overall military capabilities and material capabilities (i.e. nuclear weapons)?

3) Importance and Interest of Questions

The role that technology plays on states' decisions to engage in military conflict and in the outcomes of military conflicts is extremely important for a variety of reasons. The significance of technology in military affairs has implications on states' political and military behavior. The implications are both theoretical (i.e. shedding light on the ongoing debate about the nature of the offense-defense balance) and practical (i.e. helping states make decisions about how to allocate spending in defense budgets). In addition, the role of technology in military conflict may affect whether or not states should engage in various behaviors like arms races or alliance formation. Most importantly, a better understanding about what makes states' likely to engage in war, helps us to work towards avoiding unnecessary conflict and working to maintain peace and stability.

4) Preliminary Answers to Questions

I hypothesize that technology is a key determinant on states' decision to engage in military conflict. I think that technology is a major factor and that the perception of relative offensive technological superiority makes states' more likely to go to war. I hypothesize the following in response to the questions stated above:
Hypothesis 1: States that have or believe they have greater relative offensive technological military capabilities are more likely to engage in military conflict.
   1a) In periods of offense dominance, states that have or believe they have greater relative offensive technological military capabilities are more likely to engage in military conflicts.
   1b) In periods of defense dominance, states that have or believe they have greater relative offensive technological military capabilities are more likely to engage in military conflicts.

Hypothesis 2: States that have or believe they have lesser relative offensive technological military capabilities are less likely to engage in military conflict.
   2a) In periods of offense dominance, states that have or believe they have lesser relative offensive technological military capabilities are less likely to engage in military conflicts.
   2b) In periods of defense dominance, states that have or believe they have lesser relative offensive technological capabilities are less likely to engage in military conflict.

Hypothesis 3: Relative technological superiority is not the primary determinant for war outcomes, however, it is often a necessary condition for a military victory.

Hypothesis 4: Relative technological military superiority inflates states perceptions of their overall military capabilities.

When looking at technology I will break down technology into the six areas discuss in “What is the Offense-Defense Balance?”. These areas are mobility, firepower, protection, logistics, communication and detection. The technological capabilities of states in conflict will be analyzed in these six areas to determine relative technological capabilities. Building upon the work of Van Evera, I plan to validate some of these hypotheses through a series of comparative case studies (between Great Powers) from the 1700s to present. Some of these hypotheses will be validated through statistical analysis of data sets. This will be further explained in the research approach section of my proposal.

5) Competing Answers/Interpretations

There has been a great deal of debate over the nature of offense-defense theory and about the factors that contribute to the balance. Specifically, there have been contrasting views over the
role that technology ought to play in theories of the balance. As a result, there has been debate over the role that technology plays in states' propensity for war, as well as war outcomes. As explained by Stephen Biddle the offense-defense balance theory essentially has two parts to it. First, it involves a theoretical approach as to the implications of the offense-defense balance (the effects of the offense-defense balance). Second, it involves a theory regarding the variables that contribute to the offense-defense balance (the causes of the offense-defense balance). Both Stephen Biddle and Stephen Van Evera offer competing views on the nature of the offense-defense balance in that they shed light on different factors that they argue contribute to the balance.

> Van Evera

In his article “Offense, Defense and the Causes of War,” Van Evera argues that the causes of offense/defense dominance are: military factors, geography, social/political orders and diplomatic factors. In his category of military factors, he discusses the significance of technology as a component to the offense-defense balance. For Van Evera, technology can contribute to either offense dominance or defense dominance (depending on the nature of the technology at the time). Van Evera also discusses the dangers that can be brought about by offense-dominance, or more significantly, by a perception of offense dominance. He argues that there are ten war-causing effects that result from offense dominance and he goes through each of these. Van Evera states his primary hypotheses to be:

1) War is more likely when conquest is easy or when states think conquest is easy.

2) States that have or believe that they have large offensive opportunities or defensive vulnerabilities will initiate and fight more than other states


3) States will initiate or fight wars in periods when it has or thinks it has larger offensive and defensive capabilities

Van Evera looks at three case studies to validate his claims. Through his case studies he demonstrates support for each of his hypotheses. While Van Evera makes good arguments, he does not place as much emphasis on military technology as I feel is warranted. In addition, he uses only three cases to support his claim, rather than a large number of cases with empirical findings. He also recognizes that his work leaves some questions unanswered. One such question is as to why states' often have a greater perception of offense dominance than there is in reality. He goes on to state that such a false inflated perception helps to contribute to somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy making modern powers a threat to their own selves. For this reason, he argues that there need to be ways to control the perception of offense dominance through policies.

> **Stephen Biddle**

Stephen Biddle addresses the arguments presented by Van Evera and begins his article, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," by pointing out the intuitive appeal of Van Evera's theory. Biddle writes, "It makes sense that military prospects for attack ought to affect the likelihood of aggression or that arms races should be more intense when technology is better suited for attack or defense." However, he points to the empirical problems with such an approach because the causes and the nature of the balance fail to be operationalized. He attempts to address this problem by proposing a new offense-defense theory that rests on force employment. Biddle's central claims are stated as follows:

1) He argues that technological change is not responsible for the major political consequences that are so widely attributed to such change
2) Variations in force employment are primarily responsible for the variations in offense-defense balance.

While Biddle's analysis does a better job at empirically analyzing the issues at hand, I do not agree with his argument regarding force employment as the driving force behind the offense-defense balance. Biddle emphasizes the importance of looking at how resources are used and behavior rather than just the resources possessed, however, he only looks at war outcomes and he does not look at situations that may or may not have manifested into conflict. He disregards the important of technology and holds it to be the least powerful independent variable in his study. He argues that technology only works to widen the gap between victor and defeated, rather than changes the actual war outcome. He does not take into account that states with an extreme technological disadvantage may have chosen an outcome other than war when faced with a potential military conflict. In addition, he fails to address the subjective nature of perceived offensive and defensive capabilities. Biddle states that he is only focusing on the objective nature of the balance. I think that this purely objective approach is problematic.

Biddle also criticizes the traditional approach to the offense-defense theory because holding technology as the central to the offense-defense balance is viewed as accepting the idea that there is a common body of technological knowledge available to all states during a given period. Obviously, this is not the case. Biddle correctly points out that not all states have access to the various technological capabilities at a given time. For this reason, when discussing the results of the offense-defense balance, one should limit oneself to discussing the states in a given period, which had access to the wide range of technological capabilities that were available. Van Evera does this by analyzing the offense-defense balance among the Great Powers from the
1700s to Present.

*Jervis on Nuclear Weapons and the Psychology of Deterrence*

Jervis provides an additional discussion on the political effects of one form of technology, namely nuclear weapons. He also writes about the psychological effects of perceived military superiority and/or vulnerability. Both of these discussions are relevant to the questions that I plan on examining in my thesis. In his writings regarding nuclear weapons, Jervis argue that nuclear weapons have contributed to the lack of major war post-WW2 because the costs of major war have become too high. Jervis claims that the devastation of a total war would be extremely large, both sides would face the devastation and the devastation would be able to occur in an extremely short period of time. Jervis describes a the implications of this nuclear revolution to include: the impossibility of defense, the impossibility of military victory, peace, preservation of the status quo, rarity of crises, difficulty and importance of credible threats and arms races to show resolve.

In his discussions on nuclear weapons, Jervis demonstrates how one new technology can have a profound impact on the likelihood of conflict, the outcomes of conflicts and states relations with one another. In addition, in much of his work he places a large emphasis on the psychological component of nuclear weapons. He argues that states’ beliefs about nuclear weapons help to create the reality. In other words, states expectations about war or peace help to foster a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. As a result, Jervis emphasizes the importance of arms control, in terms of a psychological function. For Jervis, “The main purpose of arms control in the nuclear era is to control our expectations and our beliefs, not our arms.” This psychological component of technology is taken into account in Van Evera’s account of the role of technology in the offense-defense balance, however, Biddle seems to ignore the significance of the
psychological perceptions about various weapons and military technology. This psychological aspect of perceived superiority/vulnerability is extremely relevant to the role that technology plays in states’ propensity for war. I hope to apply Jervis’ work to some other specific technological advancements in military capabilities.

6) Research Approach

My research approach is going to combine the approaches taken by both Stephen Biddle in his article “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense” and Van Evera in his article, “Offense, Defense and the Causes of War”. I hope to build upon the theoretical ideas presented by Van Evera and formulate them into a more empirical and operationalized study. I would like to impose a methodology similar to Biddle’s on the some of Van Evera’s claims, however, I will focus on actual/perceived technological capabilities as my primary independent variable. Like Biddle, I will use the Correlates of War Data for war outcome results to look at technology’s impact on conflict outcomes. While Biddle discounts the effects of technology and basically just uses technology as a variable that increases over time, I would like to look at the relative actual and perceived technological capabilities between states that went to war. I would also like to expand my research to compare the relative technological capabilities/perceived capabilities in situations that could have resulted in military conflict, but were settled by other means. For the less empirically focused portion of my paper, I would like to study a number of cases in greater detail to try to determine the causes for some states’ inflated perceptions about offensive capabilities. Specifically, I am trying to determine if the advent of certain technologies coincide with the periods of inflated perceptions regarding a states’ offensive capabilities. Lastly, I will look at a few specific technological developments in military technology (i.e. nuclear weapons,
precision-guided missiles, cyber-attack capabilities, etc) and discuss other implications that these new technologies are having on the nature of warfare.

7) **Resources Available at Dartmouth**

There are a variety of resources available at Dartmouth that will assist me throughout the writing of my thesis. In addition to the relevant literature that is available in the library and the assistance of my advisor, there are two other resources that I hope to use throughout the course of my research. This past fall, I interned for Michael Vatis, the Director of the Dartmouth Institute of Security Technology Studies. The ISTS is funded U.S. Justice Department's National Institute of Justice, Office of Science and Technology and it focuses on developing technology to protect the United States against attacks that would target US computer systems or technological infrastructure. In addition, Dartmouth is also home to the John Sloan Dickey Endowment for International Understanding.
8) Preliminary Annotated Bibliography


Biddle, Stephen. "Assessing Theories of Future Warfare." *Security Studies*. Volume 8.1, August 1998, 1-74. He discusses the Revolution in Military Affairs and argues that much of the policy changes that have been proposed in response to theories surrounding RMA are premature and rests on little empirical evidence. He offers an empirical test to demonstrate his support for his claim. I think that Biddle repeatedly underestimates the role of technology and he fails to understand that states perceptions may influence behavior just as much as objective realities and capabilities. In addition, Biddle tends to focus on war outcomes, rather than decisions to engage in war or not engage in war.

Buzan, Barry. *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations*. St. Martin's Press. 1987: Buzan provides an overview of the revolution in military technology, as it pertains to firepower, protection, mobility, communications and intelligence. He discusses the effects of the revolution and he discusses the nature of the global spread of military technology. He also includes discussions on nuclear proliferation, arms control and debates over deterrence theories.

Dean, Lt. Col. David. *Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology*. Air University Press, 1986: The book is comprised of a series of papers regarding low-intensity conflict and modern technology. There is a section of the book that is devoted to technology and the types of technology that are essential in low-intensity conflicts.

Freedman, Lawrence. "The Revolution in Strategic Affairs," *Adelphi Paper 318*, International Institute for Strategic Studies. Oxford University Press, 1998: Freedman discusses the changes associated with the revolution in military affairs and argues that technological changes don’t necessarily mean that the issues that there will be changes in warfare or the changes in the motivations behind warfare. However, Buzan points to a political revolution that has taken place as a result of an end to the Cold War and he discusses the strategic revolution associated with this revolution.


Jervis, Robert. "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?" *International Security*, Volume 16, Issue 3 (winter 1992-93) 39-73: Jervis includes a discussion on the declining benefits of war and the increased costs associated with war and writes about some of the effects of nuclear deterrence on world politics. He writes predictions about the future of world politics are difficult and that the United States faces a wide range of choices in the type of
foreign policy that it adopts. I hope to be able to provide some recommendations for future United States foreign policy, based on the findings of my research.


O’Hanlon, Michael. *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare*. Brookings Institution Press. 2000: O’Hanlon looks at the ideas surrounding the current revolution in military affairs (RMA) and looks at how such a possibility should affect U.S. military decisions. He does not fully accept the RMA idea, but he does recognize a number of important trends in technology as it relates to military conflicts. He thinks that computers and electronics will make major advancements possible in war, however, he refutes a number of other ideas at the heart of the arguments of RMA proponents.

